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Abstract
This paper discusses one of the most significant challenges of next-generation
big data (BD) federation platforms, namely, Hadoop access control. Privacy and
security on a federation scale remain significant concerns among practitioners.
Hadoop’s current primitive access control presents security concerns and limita-
tions, such as the complexity of deployment and the consumption of resources.
However, this major concern has not been a subject of intensive study in the
literature. This paper critically reviews and investigates these security limita-
tions and provides a framework called BD federation access broker to address
8 main security limitations. This paper proposes the federated access control
reference model (FACRM) to formalize the design of secure BD solutions within
the Apache Hadoop stack. Furthermore, this paper discusses the implementa-
tion of the access broker and its usefulness for security breach detection and
digital forensics investigations. The efficiency of the proposed access broker has
not sustainably affected the performance overhead. The experimental results
show only 1% of each 100 MB read/write operation in a WebHDFS. Overall,
the findings of the paper pave the way for a wide range of revolutionary and
state-of-the-art enhancements and future trends within Hadoop stack security
and privacy.
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1. Introduction
Apache Hadoop [1], the BD landmark, has become a large-scale data analyt-
ics operating system. The large community behind Hadoop has been working
to improve its stack to meet the increasing demands and requirements of BD.
Enterprises across all major industries have adopted Hadoop due to its capa-
bility to store and process an abundance of new types of data and leverage
modern data architecture. With a broad spectrum of both structured and un-
structured workloads, Hadoop abstracts the computing resource management,
task scheduling, and data management, while maintaining a satisfactory level
of security and isolation.
The Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS) [2] is typically deployed as part
of a large-scale Hadoop platform to support commodity hardware and accommo-
date different processing frameworks. It is utilized to handle data management
and access to the Hadoop ecosystem using a master/slave architecture. It is
also successfully employed by several distributed systems and can be used by
different resource schedulers as a data storage system, e.g., HTCondor [3] and
Spark [4]. IAM in the HDFS ecosystem can be defined as the set of tools and
mechanisms that enables end users and applications to interact securely with
system core functionalities, thus ensuring appropriate access to data across the
cluster. This security discipline can be separated into three abstraction layers:
identification and access control, authentication, and authorization.
As more services and users have joined the Hadoop federation portfolio in
pursuit of a scalable BD hub, access control has become increasingly critical.
One of the main obstacles in the development of an adaptive access control so-
lution for BD platforms is the lack of a standard model to which access control
rules and the associated enforcement monitor can be bound. A recent study [5]
indicates that BD, as an emerging research trend, lacks standardized models
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for unifying user/application access to resources, services, and data. More-
over, Hadoops primitive configuration lacks any classification mechanism that
improves metadata governance or facilitates auditing procedures. Therefore,
formalizing the IAM features of Hadoop 3.x, in addition to emphasizing the
complexity of securely utilizing their core functionality, is becoming a research
interest. This trend serves as a form of knowledge capture by mapping current
technologies of concern and formulating the latest Hadoop capabilities related
to access control frameworks and audit log management.
This paper highlights the need for robust access control that handles the au-
thentication and authorization operations within a federation scale. The paper
defines the associated requirements of secure BD runtime and management of
the Hadoop HDFS federation. It therefore proposes a reference model (RM)
that provides a basis for building an interoperable data federation scheme that
includes all of the major stages and reflects specifics in access control within
Hadoop clusters using modern open-source technologies. Furthermore, this pa-
per explains how the proposed models can be implemented using modern BD
infrastructure (BDI) to meet the increasing demand for scalable access controls
and digital forensics (using access log analysis). The key question we will be
asking to address the IAM challenge is as follows: How can we create a dy-
namic reference model that is compatible with the foreseen BDI scenarios in
a federated setting? We address this question by employing the proposed RM
in a novel access broker that provides a single sign-on environment. The pro-
posed BD Federation (BDF) broker is an access control logic component to
securely connect the external users with the Hadoop cluster gateway. The work
presented in this paper may be employed in a Hadoop federation environment
across multi-tenant BD clouds, as well as within on-premise data centres.
An essential application of the proposed solution deals with security audit-
ing and analysis of audit logs of BD operations. These log files contain detailed
information about all access call activities regarding BD processes and infras-
tructure to be protected by centralizing the access control of the data lake,
BD services, and underlying resources in a unified access broker pattern. This
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broker abstracts the identification, authentication, and authorization discussion
within large-scale data analytics. This layer may also afford granular insights
into pieces of information by performing security and risk assessment, track-
ing data pipeline audit logs, and examining behavioural analytics to meet their
compliance and governance demands within the Hadoop 3.x platform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the Hadoop federation and its role in supporting BD operations. It also high-
lights complementary security measurements for BD frameworks and discusses
the related work. The HDFS access control primitives and federation access
provisioning limitations on which this study is based are investigated in Section
3. Section 4 describes the logic language for defining the RM, while we imple-
ment the proposed model in a novel access broker proof-of-concept framework
in Section 5. Section 6 demonstrates the advantages of the proposed centralized
audit log management, and we ultimately provide the conclusion in Section 7.
2. Hadoop Federation
As the size of a Hadoop cluster increases, the pressure on the NameNode
and the ResourceManager increases. To alleviate this problem, Hadoop has
introduced both HDFS Federation [6] and YARN Federation [7]. HDFS Fed-
eration consists of the usage of multiple independent NameNodes, where each
NameNode is responsible for managing a subset of the whole namespace. To
understand how this federated architecture works, we need to explain how the
single HDFS is designed. HDFS is composed of two main layers:
• The namespace layer, which runs in the NameNode and is in charge of
storing all information related to directories, files, and blocks (creation,
deletion, modification, listing).
• The block storage service, which supports low level block-related opera-
tions and contains two parts:
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Figure 1: HDFS Federation Architecture with n NameNodes (NN) and Namespaces (NS) and
m DataNodes (DN)
– Block management, which runs in the NameNode and is responsible
for block creation, deletion, modification, replication, and location.
– Physical storage, which runs in the DataNodes and is responsible for
storing the data blocks and providing read/write access to them.
Whereas physical storage can be easily scaled horizontally, simply by adding
more DataNodes, previous versions of HDFS only allowed the namespace layer
to be scaled vertically, as it runs on a single NameNode. The HDFS federation
removes that limitation, allowing the namespace layer to be scaled horizontally.
It uses a federation of multiple NameNodes that are independent; i.e., they do
not require coordination with each other. Each NameNode is assigned a set of
blocks, which is called a block pool. Different blocks in a Block Pool can live
in any DataNode, and so each DataNode must register with all NameNodes in
the cluster, sending them periodic heartbeats and reports about block status.
A schema of this architecture is shown in Figure 1.
However, on Jan 16, 2019, Apache Hadoop released its 3.2.0 stable platform,
while the first stable 3.x line was released on Apr 6, 2018. This release incorpo-
rates several significant enhancements over the previous primary release line. A
federated architecture has also been proposed for Apache YARN. This approach
allows YARN to scale to tens of thousands of nodes. In this architecture, a large
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YARN cluster is split into a set of sub-clusters. Each sub-cluster has its own
ResourceManager and compute nodes. From the point of view of applications,
the federated cluster is still seen as a single huge YARN cluster, and tasks can
be scheduled on any node of the cluster. The federation system is responsible
for negotiating with the resource managers of the sub-clusters and providing
resources to each application. YARN Federation functionality relies on reliable
connectivity across sub-clusters to deploy atop the HDFS Federation. A feder-
ation architecture across data centres among several physical confines requires
further investigation.
2.1. HDFS federation
In this section, we present a brief overview of HDFS federation architecture
and highlight the Apache Hadoop security features.
2.1.1. HDFS architecture
HDFS [8] is a distributed and open-source file system designed to meet the
rapidly growing demands of large-scale data management and access. The HDFS
is composed of two primary daemons: (i) a single NameNode (NN) that is
deployed at the cluster master node and (ii) several DataNodes (DNs) running
at the cluster slaves (usually one per node). The NN runs the namespace process,
which manages the file system information and regulates access to files using
a conventional hierarchical organization. In addition, it tracks block locations
and numbers and writes log information files for auditing purposes. Internally,
a file is partitioned into multiple data blocks that are placed into various DNs
to be stored in local disks (block storage). These blocks are replicated for fault
tolerance over several DNs from different racks (if possible). The NN makes
all decisions regarding replicas and periodically receives a static heartbeat; the
default period is every 3 seconds. The NN checks the expiry time report of a
heartbeat every 200 seconds (as a default timeout). When a new file is updated,
the NN places replicas of the file blocks in different nodes and racks (if available).
Conventionally, the Hadoop cluster runs several DNs, but it has only one
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NN (and one namespace) for all DNs (HDFS High-Availability allows running
two NNs when working in active/standby mode). The DNs can be scaled both
vertically (by adding more resources to the nodes) or horizontally (by adding
more nodes to the cluster). The NN, however, may only scale vertically, which
means that one needs to add more resources (CPUs and RAM) to that NN server
to serve more DN metadata. Notice that metadata are preserved in memory for
minimizing latency and enabling faster retrieval. This approach causes a single
point of failure and, hence, limits the number of blocks, files, and directories
maintained on the file system. The HDFS Federation has been introduced to
cope with this issue.
To enable a universal block storage layer, Hadoop performed separation of
namespace and blocked storage [9]. A federation BD environment, through
multi-independent namespaces for block management and a common block pool
for data storage, improves scalability and isolation of Hadoop operations. There-
fore, by loosening the tightly coupled block storage and namespace, each DN
registers with all the NNs in the cluster (this increases the authentication re-
quirement). These DNs send periodic heartbeats, block reports and handle
commands from the NNs. This allows horizontal scaling of the NN and enables
the aggregation of geo-distributed Hadoop clusters. This feature directly en-
hances throughput by adding more access enforcers (typically, NNs in HDFS
architecture), which improves read/write operations.
Moreover, the HDFS federation services high-intensity BD applications that
block vast resources on the NN by distributing them among different names-
paces. However, this imposes authentication and authorization challenges, as
well as security concerns, which we address in the next section. For instance, a
federation cluster may improve the query performance in a Hive framework – as
Apache Hive manages data in partitions within different tables and locations.
This setting can store various tables in separate namespaces, or even save the
table partitions in different namespaces. In principle, this optimizes load bal-
ancing across multiple namespaces (e.g., one for archival data and another for
current data), which reduces each namespace load and improves the application
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Figure 2: Apache Hadoop security layer abstraction.
isolation.
2.2. Complementary security measures for HDFS federation
Figure 2 presents a security layered abstraction of the engineering BD sys-
tem, which involves several essential functions. The first three layers, identifica-
tion (ID) and access control, authentication, and authorization, are combined,
representing the IAM processes of the Apache Hadoop cluster and the objective
of this paper. The other security layers (data governance, integrity, confiden-
tiality, and security auditing) are briefly presented in this section to perform a
comprehensive security discussion of a BD environment.
• Access control is a service gateway to securely and efficiently communi-
cate with the BD federation. This layer verifies the external client’s access
to the system using the user identification (ID) and passwords. Every
client username and IP address must be in the host file or in a DNS table,
and must match the client-given password. This process may also include
Apache Knox [10], a unified gateway framework for Hadoop services and
ecosystem that can be utilized as a single-sign-on (SSO) gateway.
• Authentication is the act of confirming authentication access to the
Hadoop services and HDFS data (after user log-on to the cluster), i.e., the
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process of actually determining the client identity. In a non-secure Hadoop
mode, this layer is disabled and internal entities, i.e., clients (confirmed
by the host OS), application, and ecosystem, interact directly with the
Hadoop services. However, Hadoop secure mode [11] enables an authen-
tication mechanism to verify that an entity is what it claims to be using
the Kerberos protocol (authentication based on tokens). Each Hadoop
service and user must be authenticated by the Kerberos keytab file (bi-
nary containing the information needed to log) using Hadoop tokens to
initialize trust between a client/application and the HDFS (more details
in Section 3.3). Authentication for access to the Hadoop services web
console requires enabling the HTTP SPNEGO protocol as a backend for
Kerberos credentials [12]. Thus, preventing the stored data in HDFS from
unauthorized access is applied both to all clients accessing the cluster and
to any service claimed to be part of the cluster.
• Authorization is the process of defining access rights which an entity
(service, daemon, or client) can perform to the given service. It manages
access in the context of a specific service, resource, and data functionality
provided by the cluster. Hadoop service level authorization (SLA) man-
ages the fundamental set of permissions, such as defining the users and
groups who are authorized to make service calls (e.g., data access) to that
service. The call will pass the authorization check only if the user making
the call belongs to an authorized service entity. It also provides fine-grain
access control (table, column, and file levels) by enforcing the access con-
trol list (ACL), i.e., consistent policy administration across all Hadoop
ecosystems [13]. ACL combines three elements: effect (allow or deny), ac-
tion (e.g., data access or execution), and resources (e.g., NameNode1, Hive
table). In principle, authorization is considered to be the final IAM layer
in a Hadoop security abstraction, which means that no additional security
mechanism is required as an IAM intention for an authorized client. Nev-
ertheless, data encryption both at rest and in transition is still required, in
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addition to security analysis, auditing, and metadata governance, which
represent high-level security services when combined as in Figure 2.
• Data Governance is a capability that ensures adequate manageability
of data through the complete lifecycle (i.e., data at rest, movement, and
processing). This layer includes several dimensions, including classifica-
tion (labeling and description), source tracking, and quality across data
sources. Providing a typical store for exchanging metadata tags and at-
tributes among the Hadoop stack can be achieved using Apache Atlas [14]
and Apache Solr [15] for defining data types and fields using full-text in-
dexing and querying techniques.
• Data Integrity and Confidentiality is a capability to ensure adequate
consistency and accuracy of data-at-rest as well as in-transit. This secu-
rity layer includes validity and recoverability approaches, as Hadoop 3.x
utilizes erasure coding for fault tolerance [16]. However, aiming for confi-
dentiality, HDFS implements end-to-end encryption with so-called trans-
parent data encryption [17]. This HDFS encryption occurs at the file level
of on-disk data and is stored as NN metadata. On the other hand, Hadoop
wire-security (such as for data transfer between Web-console and client)
is managed via SSL/TLS for HTTP communications.
• Security auditing and analysis: The aggregation of log files and re-
ports provides a robust audit capability within different components of
the Hadoop ecosystem. This layer may also afford granular insights into
pieces of information by performing security and risk assessment, track-
ing data pipeline audit logs, and examining behavioural analytics to meet
their compliance demands within Hadoop.
2.3. Related work
The security of BD deployment architectures and Hadoop service trust have
always been labelled as research concerns. Several research papers have dis-
cussed the Hadoop ecosystem privacy and access management [18, 19, 20, 21,
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22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The access control requirements and privacy analysis of
Hadoop frameworks have been addressed in the literature [5, 27]. Recently,
Gupta et al. [18] and [19] formalized the access control features of Hadoop core
capabilities, as well as other security associated frameworks including Apache
Ranger and Sentry. They extend their work with the HeABAC [20] model, a
multi-layer attribute-based access control model [28, 29, 30] that provides fine-
grained authorization policies for Hadoop. Ulusoy et al. proposed an approach
for fine-grained access control authorization for MapReduce systems in [31, 32].
Big data privacy issues are also well addressed, and novel solutions have been
proposed in [27, 33, 34, 35], in addition to an SSO framework for Hadoop services
in [36]. Colombo et al. conducted a comprehensive study of big data technolo-
gies, including access control requirements, state-of-the-art and future trends,
in [37, 5, 21]. One of the earliest works by Kulkarni [38] targets wide-column
NoSQL databases which support content and context-based access control poli-
cies at different levels of the data model, such as row or column. Another work
on Cassandra datastore [39] presents a cryptographic enforcement of RBAC [40]
policies.
Access control of data and resources from multiple sources within central-
ized computing systems has been a subject of intensive studies in the literature.
Context-awareness using fuzzy logic conditions as access control approach has
been proposed in [41] to address the dynamic outsourcing environment on the
edge of the network, and for the intelligent transportation systems [42]. Aim-
ing to protect the redundant data stored over the cloud, an approach by Zhou,
Yukun et al. [43] supported flexible access control with revocation. Adopt-
ing a proxy re-encryption policy to update the process to the outsourced cloud
was reported for BD deployments [44] to support ciphertext re-encryption.
Controlling access to sensitive BD, e.g., healthcare records, using the quantum
mechanical equivalent of digital signature was introduced [45], along with an
unaddressed challenge of the data transfer process. Other than the implemen-
tations mentioned above, the BDs of time series (e.g., time-series databases)
are required to be associated with an encrypted timestamp, the authors in [46]
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proposed an access and inference control model to enforce time and value-based
constraints over the hierarchical time series data. Meanwhile, the analyzing of
malicious codes and intrusion detection for cybersecurity and malware detection
was reported [47, 48, 49, 50]
Standardizing the security development schema of secure systems was first
reported in [51]. This standardization unifies practices and languages for mod-
elling security and access control among different implementers. A reference
model for developing cloud applications was reported [52], along with a survey
that supports federated access control [53]. Researchers from the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [54] have presented a general access
control model for BD processing frameworks which introduces the novel notion
of chain of trust among entities to authorize access requests. Barker, S. proposed
meta-model and best-practices of access control modelling [55]. Both the work
of Barker and this research aim at unifying access control models by drafting
a reference model. However, herein, we address the modern Hadoop 3.x status
given the broad diversity of existent access control uniformity associated with
a federation environment. Additionally, this paper distinguishes itself by ad-
dressing the HDFS federation access control challenges and maps cutting-edge
frameworks to that problem domain.
3. Access control in HDFS
A client needs to perform tasks through the NN as a central policy enforcer
for the HDFS. The NN receives the client call and allows it to reach data files
which are stored in local disks via the DN pool. HDFS applications need a
write-once-read-many access model for files. Once a file is created and written,
it cannot be modified without an authorization access level policy. A secure
IAM model must ensure that entities (clients, processes, and daemons) are who
they claim to be (authentication) and that they have permissions to perform
the requested operation (authorization).
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Table 1: HDFS data access priority scheme.
Cluster Rack Node Path Priority
Number Number Number
Cluster 1
Rack 1
Node 1 Local First
Node 2 Node 2>Rack 1 Second
Rack 2 Node 3 Node 3>Rack 2>Cluster 1 Third
3.1. HDFS replica selection
It is important to direct the reader’s attention to “how it works” before
presenting the access challenges within the federation settings.
The HDFS cluster responds to client calls via the closest block replica to the
reader node, aiming to keep data movement and read latency to a minimum.
Thus, the preferred replica is the one stored locally (if available) to the reader
node or the replicas of the same rack to reduce bandwidth consumption (see
Table 1). If the HDFS spans multiple rack clusters, then a replica placed in the
local rack is preferred over any remote replica [56]. The NN manages this fault
tolerance operation by implementing a rack-aware policy (e.g., the first replica
is placed on the local node, the second is located in a different rack, and the
third one is stored on another node within the local rack). By analysing the
DN length to the parent, the NN selects the replica placement path. Consider
the example in Table 1 that assists in the further discussion concerning HDFS
access control and HDFS Federation (section 5). A Hadoop application will use
blocks locally within its current node. However, if the block has to be copied
from a remote DN, it will calculate and pass the block to the clients in the order
of proximity.
Figure 3 demonstrates the HDFS authorization model pattern with an HDFS
service call scenario. At first, Apache Yarn client make an HDFS call through
the NN cluster as the service level access control. The NN checks the ACL,
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Figure 3: Authorization access pattern in a
native Hadoop Yarn cluster.
Figure 4: Access pattern in a multi execution-
engine Hadoop cluster with no central policy
service.
which had been set by the administrator, and the service call is either granted
authorization to proceed with the operation or to deny it. Finally, the NN
writes audit log information to a local file. System administrators must set this
security mechanism for each Hadoop component and execution engine (Spark,
Hive, HBase, etc.). Every ACL has one NN (and only one), while the NN could
or could not have an ACL. In the last case, any service call made by the user
that reaches the NN will gain access to DNs (the user still needs the ID and
password for the external log).
3.2. Apache Hadoop federation access management
A cluster with high-level data analysis, i.e., sequel operations, and different
execution engines will contact its security module (local policy authority or ac-
cess enforcer) to validate access control rules. Figure 4 illustrates a Hadoop Yarn
cluster with several data access requests managed by different BD execution
frameworks. The cluster administrators need to separately create the ACLs by
specifying authorization access based on the local policy authority (e.g., HDFS
ACL, Hive ACL, etc.) for each framework [13]. The NN will perform a permis-
sion check before issuing any operation; those ACLs are located and defined in
the $HADOOP CONF DIR/hadoop-policy.xml file. In this case, the request will
reach the local authorization module that allows/denies the operation and writes
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its own logs to a local file. These individual access enforcers (see Figure 4), cou-
pled to file permissions and different Hadoop framework orchestration, make it
challenging and time-consuming to set a secure BD environment, not to men-
tion the new BD federation features and multi-tenant BDaaS cloud deployment
architecture. A solution relies on a cross-service authorization framework that
provides a centralized policy authority to store and manage security policies for
multiple ecosystem components.
3.3. Limitations of BD Federation access control
The broad participation nature of both clients and execution frameworks
that are associated with the Hadoop federation warns against security concerns.
In addition to the complexity of settings, dynamically and elastically scaling
client authorization and policy provisioning are challenging tasks. A central
policy enforcer to manage the access discussions seems mandatory. This section
outlines the inherited limitations of implementing HDFS access control in a
federation setting.
Restricting access to the data stored in HDFS requires ensuring an accurate
level of access by both clients and applications to the ecosystem components. In
this way, by enabling Hadoop secure mode, every client, service, daemon, and
process (which we refer to as entities) running within Hadoop must authenticate
its membership of the cluster. The Hadoop underlying authentication service
is based on Kerberos encapsulation, a leading local area network certificate-
based protocol. Kerberos is a three-way protocol that requires every task to
be authenticated before accessing the data. Therefore, only verified HDFS DN
could register with the NN, and every task must be authenticated via the three-
way handshake process before resource acquisition. This approach can cause
performance degeneration in distributed clusters (e.g., think of a MapReduce
application with thousands of tasks).
One solution to this problem is to complement Kerberos with Delegation
Tokens (DT), a lightweight authentication process. With DT, a client or ap-
plication is first authenticated with Kerberos, and DT is then applied for sub-
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sequent and iterative service calls. Thus, the cluster services and daemons are
only authenticated with Kerberos, while the client’s subsequent service calls
and job tasks will use the DT credentials to interact with the HDFS. The use
of Kerberos and DT in secure HDFS federation authentication is described in
Figure 5:
1. Clients (and every entity) are initially confirmed to contact the NN using
Kerberos authentication, and each client receives a DT certificate from
the NN server to access the HDFS DNs using block tokens (access tickets)
for every block with which they must communicate.
2. The client uses the access ticket for subsequent service calls, instead of
using Kerberos. Furthermore, the distributed tasks use that DT certificate
on behalf of clients to securely reach the NN at runtime.
3. The client and the distributed tasks can access the HDFS DN using the
granted access tickets, which declare that the caller has the stated access
rights to the data blocks within the job submission.
A single-sign on (SSO) architecture can be managed using Kerberos with
the lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP), which is enabled by set-
ting Hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.url to true. Alternatively, im-
plementing a single gateway that handles client access management behind a
firewall can be achieved by employing Apache Knox. Knox will allow/deny users
to access the ecosystem services before interacting with the Hadoop cluster.
Following user verification using the Knox gateway, Knox will use its Kerberos
principals to securely confirm access with other Hadoop services and daemons.
3.4. Problem definition
The previous example demonstrates a single client contacting the NN, while
several authentication mechanisms must be sequentially acquired for each Hadoop
entity (daemon, client, and task). The DT ticketing process considerably de-
creases the amount of authentication requests; however, we argue that a fed-
eration Hadoop cluster can process the login requests of thousands of entities
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Figure 5: A simplified diagram of the HDFS federation authentication mechanisms.
within a short period. A federation operation may require authorization checks
for different components of the path: not only the final entity (as for a multi-tier
federation architecture) This serialization of authentication before issuing the
task will degenerate the system throughput in a large-scale data cluster and
promptly become a bottleneck. This bottleneck may involuntarily cause a dis-
tributed denial of service attack within a federation environment. In addition,
information logs are stored and managed locally (by NNs) without any classifi-
cation mechanism that improves metadata governance or facilitation of auditing
procedures.
Relying on Hadoop IAM as demonstrated in figures 4 and 5 could present
the following underlying limitations:
1. Access control complexity: Hadoop core IAM requires a client to go
through multi-permission stages for each service that it is willing to con-
tact. This results in additional time and bandwidth consumption in a
federation setting. Additionally, the fact that Kerberos/DT tickets are
time-limited means that we need to re-authenticate the entities based on
the given maximum lifetime. A client must request a new DT and pass it
to the running process.
2. Long-running services: Due to token expiration time, supporting long-
running jobs beyond the token maximum lifetime is a difficult task (e.g.,
17
aggregating logs) [57]. This involves a continual reauthentication process
that requires cancelling all running tasks in order to start a new session.
The new features of Hadoop 3.x need to include an adaptive mechanism
for each expired token to continue to support the long-lived YARN appli-
cations service [58].
3. Communication orchestration: There could be thousands of node-to-node
communications for a job, resulting in the same magnitude traffic without
a centralized (third-part) orchestration service that enforces authorization
policies in a fine-grain model to guarantee data security across the Hadoop
cluster.
4. Data integrity: The communication channels between services still need
to be secure; there is no end-to-end data encryption. This issue indicates
that tokens need to be encrypted over the network (SSL/TLS may be
utilized). Sniffing (sniffing attack) tokens are sufficient to incorporate an
authorized entity, thus prompting a vulnerability to threaten the HDFS
data.
5. Node orchestration: Time needs to be roughly uniform across cluster
nodes; else, the time-limited tokens will not work. Additionally, any com-
promised entity may manipulate the local time to infinitely extend the
ticket lifetime.
6. Audit log management: It is difficult to analyse or test against the security
configurations of each entity within a federation cluster. Different NNs
separate log categories from regular processing logs and store them in
separate locations with varying policies of persistence.
7. Security auditing: It fails to cope with modern auditing demands of large-
scale distributed clusters, as in a federation. Any secure IAM model should
not only secure the access control but should be able to perform security
auditing at the service level: for instance, incident reporting, behavioural
analytics, and regular risk assessment of the cluster entities.
8. Access control scalability: Adding new security features, cluster entities,
and updating policies, could require a complicated (and time-consuming)
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process that must be configured carefully. This model might be acceptable
for a relatively small setup, but not for a federation infrastructure.
4. Federation access control reference model
A service-oriented metamodel for access control support in BD federation
platforms is presented in Figure 6. The Federated Access Control Reference
Model (FACRM) is a set of architecture components that are associated with
the security development of BD environments. FACRM also addresses many
technical aspects that optimize context-specific design, which need to be clari-
fied at different granularity levels. The FACRM is characterized by (i) ease of
distributing secure access at scale, (ii) accelerated policy spawning and provi-
sioning, (iii) providing ease-of-use horizontal scalability, and (v) flexibility for
adapting to the service provider requirements and demands. Some highlighted
elements will be discussed in Section 7.
Next, we describe the FACRM components as listed below:
IdentificationAccessManagement(IAM) Maintains the access control
status of system entities within three layers of defense: ID gateway (to reach the
cluster), authentication (identify verification; allowed to contact the underlying
services), and authorization (which access rights and permissions are held).
a- GatewayManager: a registration authority for external login and all REST
APIs. It represents the first IAM stage for verifying client service calls. It could
employ either simple user name/password or a third-party framework, namely
Apache Knox. By leveraging Knox as the cluster access point and URL gateway,
it enforces access discussions behind the infrastructure firewall. Hence, failed
requests neither reach the Hadoop daemon nor operate on its entities (e.g.,
NN and DN). In this scenario, Knox is composed of three main components to
validate the access of several connections:
i- UserID: identification obtained via profile (name/password) and Hadoop
can set the group mapping service [59]. However, resolving URL access via
groups is managed via LDAP with simple authentication using JNDI-API.
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ii- SupportComponentUI: Knox provides WebSSO capabilities to the Hadoop
cluster. It is therefore essential to support different system component UIs
and to link them to the end user. Examples include Apache Ambari UI for
cluster development and orchestration and the Ranger admin console for set-
ting/modifying policies.
iii- TokensExchange: maintains a secure interaction among different frame-
works and clients by providing a universal authentication platform that ab-
stracts token exchange within federated Hadoop clients.
b- Authentication: the second stage of access control, which uses the client
identification to authenticate the job service calls (after validating the client
access to the cluster in the previous stage). The process takes place by spec-
ifying the core-site.xml in the Hadoop configuration files through enabling the
hadoop.security.authentication feature. This configuration can be either simple
or Kerberos authentication. In a multi NNs environment, like a federation en-
vironment, Kerberos manages the DNs authentications by defining the entities
which are allowed to communicate with the HDFS manager.
c- Authorization: the final stage of access control that sets each client per-
missions within the cluster entities. By default, this service is disabled; admins,
however, can enable it using the Hadoop core capability in hadoop.security.authorization
within the core-site.xml file. This includes the basic set of entity permissions
using the SLA. An additional level of access control granularity can be acquired
using HDFS POSIX ACL. For instance, ACL supports entity authorizations
such as file-permission (read, write, execute). When the client creates a new
file or sub-directory, it will automatically inherit the ACL permissions of the
parent directory. However, clients are asked to gain separate authorization for
each service. Correspondingly, client authorization (fine-grain access control)
may be managed separately via different access control vendors, such as Apache
Ranger and Sentry. Ranger provides dynamic data masking (in movement)
for several frameworks of the Hadoop stack (e.g., HBase, Storm, Knox, Solr,
Kafka, and YARN), while Sentry supports the Impala SQL query engine. The
next section will demonstrate how ACL and Ranger/Sentry roles may be used
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interchangeably in a Hadoop cluster.
WebConnection: every client log has only one gateway, while the gateway
manages several log connections.
CentralPolicyAuthority (CPA): a policy-based authority that keeps spawn-
ing access certification (tickets) for IAM and monitoring user access. It repre-
sents the central process of the IAM that releases access tickets and auditing
functionalities. These tickets map each user/group with its granted permission
and enforce service access discussions. It also sets the maximum lifetime and the
start date of each policy, as well as the user class authorization intervals. The
CPA validates the client login and creates an access certificate by checking both
the Kerberos authentication list and Ranger authorization level access. Hadoop
administrators may manage repository policies by setting up both Ranger and
ACL policies (optional). In this case, Ranger will verify the fine-grain client
access control, i.e., which HBase/Hive DB and table columns they have access
to, Kafka queues, and HDFS level of access. Meanwhile, the ACL will verify the
access control of remaining entities. However, Ranger policies will take priority
over those of ACL. If a Ranger policy does not exist, then local ACL will take
effect. Hadoop daemon authentications and internal communication (such as
task status) will primarily rely on using the Kerberos principal and keytab file
locations and are enforced using Hadoop core access control, i.e., ACL.
i- Policy: as a unique name for every policy, a policyID ensures that policies are
not duplicated in the cluster.
ii- Operation: defines the operation type (its authorization level value)
and passes a Boolean that enables/disables the authorization level for every
user/group for each service. Policies are enabled by default unless the admin
restricts them.
iii- ClientClass: assigns individual user permissions or sets group permissions
for each policy, and defines each client class according to that policy.
v- CertificateLifetime: a validation interval of the certificate for the client
session on the system.
PolicyRepository: a file or DB that stores the certifications, as well as the
22
auditing logs information. The repository functions may regularly include cache
policies and track ticket updates (status saving). Numerous AuthorizationEn-
forcer daemons will write auditing logs to the PolicyRepository (as a unified
auditing store). These policies can be classification-based, prohibition-based,
time-based, and location-based.
AuthorizationEnforcer: a process that enforces access decisions based on
the CPA policies before allowing communication with its underlying services.
It represents the NN daemon (see Figure 3) in a native HDFS access control
pattern. To generalize the IAM processes within different methodologies (i.e.,
only utilizing the Hadoop core capabilities or employing a third party), the
presented metamodel separates this functionality. Every service call thus must
pass through a predefined AuthorizationEnforcer before reaching the service.
AuthorizationAgents: a distributed representative component that be-
longs to the AuthorizationEnforcer. Each service daemon (DN, HBase table)
has an AuthorizationAgent that approves the access call. The AuthorizationA-
gent could be an ACL or a Ranger policy agent.
Service: the system processing framework, execution engines, and HDFS
DNs. These services may include, but are not limited to: MapReduce for batch
querying, Apache Spark for micro-batches, and Apache Storm for real-time pro-
cessing. A comprehensive security ecosystem will require performing auditing
measurements at the service level of BD applications and frameworks.
SecurityAuditing: tracks the service calls and status of requests, in addi-
tion to monitoring client activities. This service may include identifying security
and performance issues within the local log files or employing the Apache Ea-
gle framework. These services require security auditing to improve the overall
security measurements.
SecurityAnalysis: carrying out a security assessment based on client be-
havioural analysis, incident reports, and audit pieces of information.
Admin: the one who sets the policy for other users of the system. The
admin depends on the SecurityAnalysis and client demands to define the IAM
policies. Admin is also responsible for securely installing/configuring the clus-
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Figure 7: A high-level abstraction of general access broker pattern vs. the proposed BDF
access broker
ter entities, maintaining a secure operational environment, performing security
patching policy, and scaling computing resources based on peak utilization.
5. Implementation and Validation
In general, BDF provides a systematic way to dynamically provision the
user demands with elastic resources and services over shared data blocks. Im-
plementing federated authorization and delegation to enhance BD client access
decisions is vital for the success of adopting these new features of Hadoop 3.x.
In this paper, we argue that the FACRM is essential for the concept of unifying
the IAM in a BDF infrastructure and the data that they stock. We demon-
strate how the proposed components of BDF deployments can be brought to a
secure access broker architectural pattern. This BDF access broker abstracts
the identification, authentication, and authorization discussion within the large-
scale data analytics of the Hadoop 3.x platform. Furthermore, we explain the
required steps to utilize the FACRM as a multi-tier Hadoop architecture within
any deployment architecture.
5.1. Federation Access Broker
Conventionally, system architectures employ an intermediate layer, i.e., in-
termediate brokers that orchestrate the underlying services communications
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with external entities. The most common implementation of such architec-
tures relies on forwarding all of the clients traffic into a proxy server or gateway
for authentication. Such applications are called access brokers, which provide
perimeter security by adding an authorization layer based on policies. An access
security broker is thus an on-premise or cloud-based security policy enforcement
point. It is placed between the external client and the underlying services pro-
vided by the system.
In general, the broker architectural pattern can be used to structure dis-
tributed systems with decoupled components that interact through remote ser-
vice invocations. In this study, we present and demonstrate a pattern for this
type of system, and we highlight its importance on the federation scale. Figure 7
shows a conventional access broker (on the left) and an abstracted architecture
of the proposed BDF access broker. The proposed BDF access broker aims to
abstract the management of the remote access calls to Hadoop federation ser-
vices and data without user intervention. Thus, it is responsible for coordinating
security policies (authentication and authorization) as BDF assets are accessed
(data, services, and infrastructure). It also enables centralized control through
the utilization of a unified pattern, which facilitates auditing and analysis.
The proposed architecture broker pattern in Figure 8 is composed of (i) au-
thentication (credentials and passwords) using Apache Knox, (ii) authorization
policy enforcement using Apache Ranger, and (iii) security analysis/auditing
capabilities using a centralized access audit log repository and Apache Hadoop
3.x. In particular:
1. Knox gateway access: employed for external client identification and clus-
ter access.
2. Ranger authorization assignment: the clientID is passed to Ranger to
validate the access call to contact NNs, and a secure session is established.
If successful, Ranger responds with a certificate for authorization level
access and assigns the permissions of each NN (defined by the admin) to
reach the stored data in the DNs which belong to that specific NN.
25
Figure 8: BDF access broker architecture pattern
3. Security log: access audit logs are created with each attempt to reach the
data and are stored in unified HDFS storage (see Section 6).
5.2. Formal Access Control Model Components
We have formally defined the federation supported access control model in
Table 2. This model has been adapted from the object tagged RBAC model [19]
for Hadoop, and introduces required components to demonstrate the federation.
The basic components for the model include a finite set of Users (U), Groups
(U), and subjects (S), which are created by the user and run on its behalf. A user
can belong to groups, and permission can be assigned to groups which trickle to
the member users. Hadoop Services (HS) are the required daemon background
processes, including NameNode, DataNode, YARN ResourceManager, etc., to
which the user must be allowed access. In the case of federated Hadoop 3.0,
because we have multiple NNs in the system, the user must have access to only
specific ones. OPHS are the actions of Hadoop services. ACLs have been used
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Table 2: Federation Supported Hadoop Access Control Model
Basic Sets and Functions
– U, G and S (finite set of users, groups and subjects, respectively)
– HS, OPHS (finite set of Hadoop services and operations, respectively)
– directUG : U→ 2G, mapping each user to a set of groups, equivalently UGA ⊆ U ×G
– HS-PRMS = 2HS×OPHS , set of Hadoop service permissions
Permission Assignments
– PAHS ⊆ (U ∪G)×HS-PRMS, mapping entities to Hadoop service permissions.
Alternatively,
hsprms : (x) → 2HS-PRMS, defined as hsprms(x) = {p | (x,p) ∈ PAHS, x ∈ (U ∪ G)}
Effective User Permissions
• effectiveHSprms : U→ 2HS-PRMS, defined as
effectiveHSprms(u) = hsprms(u) ∪
⋃
g ∈ {directUG(u)}
hsprms(g)
User Subject
• userSub : S→ U, mapping each subject to its creator user, where the subject
acquires some or all of the permissions of the creator user.
Hadoop Service Access Operation Decision
A subject s ∈ S is allowed to perform an operation op ∈ OPHS on a service hs ∈ HS
if the effective permissions of userSub(s) include permission assignments for hs ∈ HS.
Formally, (hs,op) ∈ effectiveHSprms (userSub(s))
in native Hadoop service authorization capabilities to restrict access to users.
As shown in the table, the Hadoop service permissions (HS-PRMS) are the
power set of the cross products of HS and OPHS. A many to many relation
PAHS specifies the assignment of Hadoop service permissions to the users or
groups. In this way, a user can be assigned permission to access Namenodes in
the system, either directly or through group membership (using the sufficient
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Table 3: BDF access Broker proof of concept validating environment.
Node Number Hadoop Daemon Hardware &Configuration
2 NameNode VCPUs: 8, RAM: 16GB, HDD: 160GB
3 DataNode VCPUs: 4 RAM: 8GB HDD: 80GB
Common criteria: 1 Gbps network connection, Ubuntu 16.04 LTS OS.
permissions effectiveHSprms). For example, a user u1 may only be allowed to
access Namenode namenode1, and then the permission assignment must be only
for that tuple (u1,namenode1) in the PAHS relation.
A user creates a subject stated by the userSubfunction. The subject obtains
either some or all of the permissions of its creator user. A subject is allowed to
access a Hadoop service if its creator user has the permissions assigned to it by
the security administrator.
5.3. Experiment and results
Aiming to validate the BDF access broker, we implement an OpenStack [60]
based Hadoop cluster that is configured as one rack of five nodes using two
different node types, as detailed in Table 3. The bar chart in Figure 9 illus-
trates a performance comparison of the WebHDFS read operation in two use
cases: the first without utilizing any security measurements (native WebHDFS
access), and the second by employing the proposed BDF access broker archi-
tecture pattern. The prime motivation for this performance evaluation is to
gain an understanding of how the performance will be impacted with respect
to Knox and Ranger. Overall, it can be observed that the performance effect,
i.e., the time needed to process different file sizes, seems to be minimal. A
more specific study on performance degradation is eventually needed, but for
this proof-of-concept, it is correct to state that the performance has not been
significantly impacted.
To define the relationship between the basic WebHDFS configuration and se-
cure WebHDFS configuration with the proposed broker, we compare the speeds
of the two methods. We fitted two linear regression models (see Appendix A)
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that can be found in Table 4 and 5. In the first case, the slope is approximately
0.24, and 0.25 in the second. These results show that the time increases by only
1% for each MB using the secure approach. Figure 9 also shows the time needed
to perform WebHDFS calls (read/write) over different data points (data chunks
between 100 MB and 500 MB).
Table 4: Access Control impact on Read performance with Sample Standard Deviation (SSD)
and Transfer Speed (TS)
100MB 200MB 300MB 400MB 500MB TS Mean Median SSD*
Native WebHDFS 23.64 47.45 69.63 94.23 120.62 25 MB/s 71.11 69.63 38.08
BDF Access Broker 25.07 49.36 72.05 98.1 127.85 26 MB/s 74.49 72.05 40.26
Table 5: Access Control impact on Write performance with Sample Standard Deviation (SSD)
and Transfer Speed (TS)
100MB 200MB 300MB 400MB 500MB TS Mean Median SSD*
Native WebHDFS 16.55 33.9 48.7 65.9 84.43 42 MB/s 49.9 48.7 26.54
BDF Access Broker 21 43 61.8 83.69 107.2 - 63.34 61.8 33.71
A box and whisker chart in Figure 10 shows the distribution of data into
quartiles, highlighting the mean and outliers. Our experiment shows the box
and whisker plot medians, interquartile ranges, and ranges of the secure and
non-secure approaches. This experiment aimed to identify covariates that could
influence the length of time taken to perform a read/write call by using the box
and whisker plots to allow visual comparison of the median and spread. Areas
of potential interest are highlighted for future prospective work. The whiskers
extend from the box to the highest and lowest values, and our experiment shows
that no outliers exist. Also, Figure 11, shows that the relationship between the
two variables is positive linear.
6. Access Audit Log Management and Analysis
NN, as a data lake gateway, writes access audit log information to local files
after each successful/failed access call. These access log files generally contain in-
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(a) WebHDFS Read (b) WebHDFS Write
Figure 9: Performance analysis of WebHDFS operation within different file sizes
(a) WebHDFS Read) (b) WebHDFS Write
Figure 10: A box and whisker plot displays a performance comparison of BDF broker against
native (non-secure) Hadoop implementation
(a) WebHDFS Read (b) WebHDFS Write
Figure 11: Graph of the relationship between secure and non-secure WebHDFS rates
formation regarding the user and the data the user accessed. Typically, Hadoop
creates logs after each user read/write call using Apache Log4j files [61], i.e., a
Java library. This detailed log information is managed locally by each Hadoop
component and provides a useful accounting process (e.g., timestamp and IP
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address) that logs all operations. The log files may serve multiple purposes, such
as debugging operational issues and regulatory compliance. They also provide
security capabilities to execute forensics from an access audit perspective (e.g.,
user logs over HTTP). In particular, access audit logs are valuable pieces of
information for conducting security auditing and analysis of the Hadoop cluster
with high operational resolution.
However, analysing the collected YARN and HDFS logs generated by appli-
cations of many distributed components (locally at each daemon) is a difficult
and insufficient task. Each Hadoop daemon creates its own output log messages
and manages them in a local directory (on the node on which it is running).
Hadoop Archives may be employed to reduce the number of small files and thus
the stress on the NN [62]. However, it is still difficult to perform security anal-
ysis or digital forensics over a large-scale Hadoop federation model that could
include dozens of NNs and hundreds of DNs with broad user participation. An-
other way to reduce the complexity of the distributed log file analysis is by
utilizing log aggregation: for instance, YARN log aggregation, a management
process that fuses different log files from various sources in a centralized repos-
itory to facilitate the analysis of the collected logs. This feature is disabled
by default; by enabling it, the log files of different daemons will be allocated
to a centralized directory (e.g., HDFS). However, even using this feature, the
large amount of aggregated data in Hadoop federation architecture will lack
governance requirements, like file tagging, labeling, and classification. It will
be stressful for investigators to examine such pieces of information, and it can
easily frustrate them.
The proposed access broker not only provides fine-grained access control
but also a centralized auditing approach (see Figure 12). By employing the
Ranger Audit Server, the BDF access broker will aggregate all access logs into a
centralized repository (RDBMS, HDFS, or Log4j). The log aggregation service
will regularly check the running tasks and start to aggregate and transfer the logs
to a centralized repository (typically HDFS). Subsequently, access audit logs can
be allocated by other digital forensics tools for any visualization or search tool for
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Figure 12: A conceptual BDF access broker log management model
further investigation. Moreover, server audit logs provide valuable information
to identify and repair system vulnerabilities.
Consider the following scenario that illustrates how to investigate a security
breach using the access audit logs by storing and analysing the access log data.
A Hadoop system administrator notices a tenfold spike in the number of
support tickets. Because the system utilization is high, due to the unusual ticket
requests, clients start facing problems logging into the VPN. The admin must
analyse the log data, since he suspects that he may be experiencing a distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attack. The questions that he must answer are: how
many connection requests have been delivered in the past few hours?, where are
the requests coming from?, and what types of connections are they (authorized
or not)? The analysis includes investigating how and when the network traffic
changed. Doing so requires engaging in three steps to transform the logs into
useful figures, namely, loading, refining, and visualizing the data, in the search
for useful information, as follows:
• Loading log data: Utilizes Apache Flume [63] to stream large amounts
of log data from the VPN server into the HDFS. The log records con-
tain a timestamp, IP address, country, and indicator about whether the
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connection was successful or not.
• Refining log data: A storage management layer must be employed to en-
able a relational view of data without affecting the data format. This
layer aids in browsing the log data (making sure it has been loaded cor-
rectly). Apache HCatalog, i.e., Hadoop catalogue, may be utilized to
provide a metadata layer and rest interface for Hadoop data. Next, the
admin needs to write them onto any data analytics framework for review
(visualization tool). An Apache Pig script may be used to push the latest
log data to the visualization tool.
• Visualizing log data: The admin interfaces the visualization tools, like
ElasticSearch (a real-time search engine and analytics tool), and Microsoft
Excel (using open database connectivity). ElasticSearch provides high-
level visualization to identify the moment when the network traffic in-
creased, where it came from, and whether or not it was authorized in
order to confirm his hypothesis about the DDoS attack. More detailed
maps may be created using the Excel Power View functionality by linking
the Apache Hive (the base of HCatalog) and Excel to determine whether
there is cause for concern.
The forensic report and the process output data are used to update the
firewall to deny requests from the unauthorized IP addresses. To automate
this update, the admin can use Apache Ozzie to schedule a job to automatically
update his firewall every hour. This report can also be used for other forensics to
respond to different security threats, prepare for compliance audits, and prepare
behavioural analytics (for security patching).
7. Summary and Future directions
Next-generation access control systems aim to become more scalable with
even finer-grained authentication and authorization management [36]. However,
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given the emerging trends of the distributed, heterogeneous, and federated in-
frastructure associated with Hadoop 3.x architectures, the need for a lightweight
security framework is inevitable. In this paper, we present a BD Federation-
oriented reference model for the secure development of access control solutions
within Hadoop clusters. The proposed model is a generic high-level conceptual
metamodel (called the FACRM) that aims to formalize Hadoop 3.x core access
control capabilities and highlight some of Hadoops top-level security projects.
It also aims to successfully implement a unified and secure BD solution over on-
premise and cloud-based deployment architectures in favour of BD applications
and frameworks. The FACRM supports myriad access control options across a
variety of policies, users, and frameworks in pursuit of modern BD infrastruc-
ture. Furthermore, this study presents an in-depth investigation of the Hadoop
IAM ecosystem and draft current access control limitations within a federation
deployment architecture. We validate the utilization of our proposed RM by im-
plementing a proof-of-concept architecture for the security and privacy of BDF
deployment. Our test conclusively confirms the effectiveness of the proposed
access pattern performance and security.
The general aim of this study is to develop an RM using open-source frame-
works (e.g., Knox, Ranger) to promote the adoption of reliable access control
mechanisms within the BD deployment architectures. It also aims to facili-
tate the security design of all clients, resources, applications, and networks in
Hadoop-based BD processing environments. In this context, the proposed fed-
eration BD access control meta-model is a service-oriented architecture (SOA)
that conforms to the best practices of independent vendors, products, and tech-
nologies. This SOA makes FACRM frameworks (a framework design based on
FACRM) into SOA frameworks. However, FACRM frameworks are not neces-
sary for BD frameworks only; it could be any framework or application that
runs over the HDFS system, which is a large-scale distributed environment
(platform). This environment is, thus, characterized by horizontal scalability,
rapid provisioning of access control, ease of access, and security. Additionally,
Our BDF access broker provides an attractive solution to the audit log problem
34
that effectively addresses compliance requirements. To map the current Hadoop
limitations (presented in Section 3.3) to the solution domain of this study, Table
6 represents these limitations as threats and links them with solutions.
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Table 6: Linking current Hadoop federation limitations to the proposed solutions
Current
limitations
Proposed solution Description
Access control
complexity
FACRM propose that
policies are written
once and applied many
times.
In Figure 6, the CentralPolicyAuthority (in green) allows the ad-
min to set up a policy and distribute it to all nodes (using the
Ranger agents), which are represented by the AuthorizationAgent
(in light blue) attached to all of the services.
Long-running
services
FACRM propose flexi-
ble time-based policies.
The CertificateLifetime in the proposed reference model corre-
sponds to the long-running services. These certificates are as-
sociated with the CentralPolicyAuthority and saved at the Poli-
cyRepository to be updated automatically upon demand.
Communication
orchestration
FACRM propose a
third-party centralized
access control.
Security verification for all of the entities (users, nodes, and dae-
mons) inside the Hadoop cluster and external clients. In Figures
7 and 8, it can be observed that the broker transfers the access
discussion responsibility from the NN to the broker.
Data integrity access control at the
file level and service
level (access call).
A federation configuration requires authorization verification of
the entire file path to create secure multi-tier federation architec-
ture. Additionally, multi-layer control (authentication and autho-
rization) occur at the beginning of operation (reading and writing
to HDFS).
Node
orchestration
FACRM provide access
control using any ap-
proach.
FACRM and BDF broker provide the base to support the mul-
tipart access control framework and technologies, e.g., RBAC,
ABAC, etc.
Audit log
management
utilization log aggrega-
tion using centralized
auditing approach.
Figure 12 illustrates how to employ the proposed broker with
Ranger Audit Server for accessing broker log management.
Security
auditing
proposal of an archi-
tecture pattern for BD
governance.
In Section 7, we proposed a scenario that transforms the logs into
useful figures by loading, refining, and visualizing the data into
incident and forensic reports using open-source frameworks. This
section shows how to investigate a security breach using Apache
Flume, Apache HCatalog, and ElasticSearch, among other tools.
Access control scal-
ability
proposal of a novel
BDF access broker.
The main components of our proposed broker provide high scala-
bility. In particular, Ranger provides centralized Hadoop security
administration and management, while Knox streamlines security
for services and users who access the cluster data and execute
jobs.
36
Overall, the primary benefits of the BDF broker architectural pattern can
be summarized in four different categories:
Enhanced security: A method to ensure that data is stored securely in
BDF and BDaaS clouds using a robust access control mechanism. This involves
using (i) Knox to expose REST and HTTP services without revealing the details
of the underlying Hadoop cluster, and (ii) Ranger for fine-grain authorization
over federation NNs.
Centralized control: Using a single gateway with a distributed agent to
prevent unauthorized access to the modern data lake. This also allows IT de-
partments to set and enforce security policies regarding data usage, access calls,
and resource utilization over secure channels.
Facilitated auditing and analysis: A centralized repository for all access
logs with a sophisticated governance and accountability approach (reporting
and regulatory compliance). This approach enables threat prevention methods,
e.g., behavioural analytics and threat intelligence.
Consolidated governance pattern: A way to ensure and prove compli-
ance with granular visibility and control to meet regulatory requirements, and
to guide the efforts of admins to ensure that the system complies with all rel-
evant regulations and standards (such as data residency) when using Hadoop
3.x.
Blockchain technology can serve as a revolutionary solution, addressing cur-
rent BD privacy concerns such as wire (end-to-end) encryption and decentraliza-
tion data-driven cryptography. As an enabling technology, blockchain provides
a sequence of block cryptography that stores all transactions, which has been
established as a solution for the large-scale distributed agents of Bitcoin system
security [64]. The core functionality of blockchain technology relies on provid-
ing robust cryptographic (each agent is assigned a private key, whereas a public
key is shared with all other agents) proof for data authentication and integrity
by providing a list of all transactions and a hash to the previous block. This
list is verified by majority agreement of nodes (P2P network where the sender
broadcasts it to all of the other nodes) that are actively involved in verifying
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and validating transactions [65].
The current Hadoop setup does not enforce access control by the DN to
access its data blocks. Another issue remains in that both NN and DN generate
a block access token using the same key. If an attacker leaked the key, he could
generate a token and access any data blocks in the HDFS. Also, the leaked DT
can be used to steal a large amount of data from HDFS, since it has the privilege
to behave as the Hadoop client and to access all content which he is allowed to
access. Any future BD Hadoop solution should consider the previous limitations
on a federation scale. To this end, FACRM addresses all concerns mentioned
above by defining a reference model for Hadoop federation; more particularly,
it presents a meta-model that includes the main access control vocabulary and
design elements, the set of configuration rules, and the semantic interpretation.
Leveraging recently published management mechanisms of policy enforcement,
e.g. [66], to combine cloud and edge federations with role-based and attribute-
based access control [18, 20] could be considered in future research. Examples
of different research directions include:
• Hybrid access control solutions: The development in usage control for
data privacy and security leads to integrating conventional access control
approaches, e.g., ABAC, with other context-based encryption technolo-
gies. This integration could include functional encryption or other gener-
alizations of identity-based encryption and attribute-based encryption for
protecting big data in the presence of mutable attributes, which may lead
to general advancement in other fields, such as IoT [67].
• Fine-grained Access Control: The need to develop active and fine-
grained approaches (policies and standards) for BDF is inevitable. The
challenge here is to extend the previous approaches with new policy edit-
ing and presentation tools (classification-based, prohibition-based, time-
based, and location-based policies) for flexible and extensible data access.
In particular, this includes policies that extend ABAC with stateful ac-
cess sessions and mutable attributes (i.e., characteristics that dynamically
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change during the session). This extension is invaluable to advance the
authorization mechanisms of the multi-tenant data lake architecture, as
well as the latest BDF model. Tackling this issue can be achieved by
deploying policy templates that extend the primary ACL (or any access
decision enforcer) as a specialization of the XACML V3.0 standard.
• Dynamic Access Control: More than ever, scalability and dynamicity
of the BD deployment architecture in terms of user and node participation
are vital for the secure delivery of security provisioning in a federation en-
vironment. There have been different adapted security mechanisms and
techniques proposed to cope with this concern. However, more research ac-
tivities are still needed to establish scalable security models and paradigms
that must be driven by BD specifications and requirements. Also, new
security abstractions for BDF are still needed to simplify the task of iden-
tifying the unimproved gaps. For instance, leveraging new mechanisms
of policy enforcement [66] to combine BDF with ABAC [20] could be
pursued in future research.
• Stateful Access Sessions: This requires restricting the BDF access
to only those authorized by the succinct gateway. However, the cur-
rent state-of-the-art BD-based encryption technologies involve transparent
data encryption. Federation environments track the participation states
and characteristics of the clients and networks traversing them with mu-
table attributes (i.e., the values of the attributes change over time during
an access session). This operation requires formulating policy templates
on top of standards such as XACML V3.0 for dynamic authorization with
stateful access sessions. This takes place at the service level (e.g., data
access calls) and does not protect data-in-transit or data-in-process (not
even the metadata). Attribute-based encryption in conjunction with the
usage control approach and ABAC can be labeled as a future direction for
this issue.
Providing new solutions for all of these research directions will promote in-
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novative BDF solutions with advanced security features. It is also expected
that adoption of the FACRM use cases will be implemented within our BD
opportunistic and elastic resource allocation (OPERA) platform. OPERA ar-
chitecture (prototype proposed in [68]) combines the computing power of high-
throughput resources available (non-dedicated) to the Hadoop 3 dedicated clus-
ter using Docker containers as worker nodes. Those non-dedicated containers
tend to be more vulnerable, which requires a robust IAM approach to minimize
security threats.
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